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I. INTRODUCTION
The Empagran decision1 concerned a global price-fixing agreement between mostly
European producers of certain vitamin products, resulting in some $7 billion in overcharge.2
Once the cartel was discovered, several types of law enforcement took place. One was public
enforcement: the U.S. Department of Justice, the European Commission, and the antitrust
agencies of several other countries imposed stiff administrative fines.3 Another was private
domestic enforcement: a class action by U.S. purchasers ended in a billion dollar settlement;
separate proceedings in other jurisdictions led to further payments, though at far lower amounts.
The most interesting proceedings were the actions brought in the Empagran case. Plaintiffs had
purchased vitamin products in countries other than the United States, many of which do not
provide the means for proper public or private prosecution against the cartel – Ecuador, Panama,
the Ukraine.4 They nonetheless brought suit in U.S. federal court and alleged applicability of the
Sherman Act under their reading of the effects doctrine as formulated in the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvement Act5: the price fixing had an effect on the U.S. market, even though these
particular plaintiffs had not suffered their particular injuries as participants in the U.S. market.
Justice Breyer held, for a unanimous court, that the plaintiffs’ claim was not covered.
Empagran is often discussed as a decision representing a transnationalist approach to
statutory interpretation in accordance with the demands of globalization; Justice Breyer himself
has referred to it in this sense in lectures.6 This is, however, only one possible reading, and
perhaps only the most superficial one. A second reading, focusing less on the rhetoric and more
on the actual application, shows the decision in Empagran to be isolationist. Despite the talk of
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globalization, the reading reveals the decision to represent a return to a stark territorialism. A
third reading, finally, focusing on what is left unsaid in the opinion, reveals a hegemonialist
opinion, in which the interests of the developed world are brought into congruence, while those
of the developing world remain outside the analysis altogether. These three readings define the
structure of this paper.
These different readings are not specific to international antitrust, nor to the role of the
Court in the twenty-first century. This becomes clear when the rhetoric in Empagran is
juxtaposed with arguments made two hundred years earlier in cases involving the extraterritorial
application of British and American laws prohibiting the slave trade. Although the slave trade
problem is very different from the problem of global cartels, some structural similarities may
explain why we find surprisingly similar arguments. Slavery, slave trade and piracy represented
the big global challenge to the nation state of the nineteenth century, not unlike the way in which
the global economy challenges the system of states in the twenty-first century. In both situations,
private actors engage in the enforcement of presumably global norms: prize seekers in the
nineteenth century, private plaintiffs in the twenty-first. Sometimes the law rewards these private
actors – as privateers on the oceans, as private attorney generals in international antitrust.
Sometimes it despises them – as pirates, or as greedy plaintiffs (or plaintiffs’ lawyers). These
structural similarities do not make these cases, or the situations they address, similar in
substance. Yet, their structural similarity invites courts to make strikingly similar arguments in
their attempts to balance the national with the international, and the public interests with the
private. This similarity can therefore provide an important element in answering the question
whether international law has changed.
II. A TRANSNATIONALIST READING:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Here is how Justice Breyer justifies limiting the scope of U.S. antitrust law in Empagran:
this Court ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable
interference with the sovereign authority of other nations. This rule of construction
reflects principles of customary international law—law that (we must assume)
Congress ordinarily seeks to follow. This rule of statutory construction cautions
courts to assume that legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of
other nations when they write American laws. It thereby helps the potentially
conflicting laws of different nations work together in harmony—a harmony
particularly needed in today's highly interdependent commercial world.7
This quote is Justice Breyer’s restatement of the Charming Betsy presumption against statutory
interpretations in violation of international law. That presumption, formulated in the nineteenth
7
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century8 is thus applied, apparently without great difficulty, to the twenty-first century situation
of global interdependence.9 In this so-perceived modern world, transnational law has become a
hybrid that transcends boundaries – between public and private law,10 between international and
comparative law,11 and even between foreign and domestic law. In Justice Breyer’s words, “we
live in a world where today the law of everywhere is becoming everywhere…. It’s spreading
around, this law… to the point where it becomes harder and harder to say, ‘well, that’s there and
this is here.’”12 This goes beyond mere interdependence of different territorial states. Instead, we
find a blurring of all boundaries, a transcendence of territorial states altogether, and the
replacement of separate legal systems with one space of legal argument.13 Territorial boundaries
no longer matter (a frequent theme in globalization debates), but that is no problem, because
good judicial craftsmanship can help bring about global harmony.
Yet another boundary is broken down for the sake of international harmony, that between
international law and international relations. Gerald Neuman’s suggestion that “in Empagran, …
Justice Breyer subtly gave the Government more law than it wanted, by invoking the Charming
Betsy canon,”14 may not be exact. The Charming Betsy presumption has traditionally been a
legal doctrine of statutory interpretation, formulated to resolve actual conflicts with international
law. “Work together in harmony,” by contrast is a doctrine of international relations, formulated
to avoid potential conflicts with foreign sovereigns. Rather than insert the Charming Betsy
doctrine into foreign relations (as Neuman suggests), the Court inserts international relations into
the Charming Betsy doctrine. In Empagran, the Court establishes itself as an organ of
international relations, and international law is merely an element in the assessment of the best
approach.
Of course, the federal courts have played a role in foreign relations since the founding of
the republic, as David Sloss has demonstrated,15 and foreign relations have always been a
consideration for the Charming Betsy presumption. In the early days of the Republic, the
deference to foreign law in statutory interpretation was often based on a desire to avoid conflict
with stronger countries.16 This could imply that the Charming Betsy presumption was historically
8
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tied to the status of the United States as a weak nation,17 and as a consequence, it could have
become dispensable once the United States became the world’s only superpower.18 But the weak
nation reasoning cannot explain everything. Not only has the doctrine survived the rise of the
United States in decisions after World War II.19 More importantly, Charming Betsy was not an
isolated U.S. decision: around the same time, British courts announced a similar doctrine for the
British Empire, then the world’s biggest power. In Le Louis, Sir William Scott (later Lord
Stowell) held that the new British antislavery act abolished slavery but did not allow seizure of
foreign ships involved in slave trade.20 The legal basis was a canon of interpretation similar to
the Charming Betsy: “neither this British Act of Parliament, nor any commission founded on it,
can affect any right or interest of foreigners, unless they are founded upon principles and impose
regulations that are consistent with the law of nations. That is the only law which Great Britain
can apply to them; and the generality of any terms employed in an Act of Parliament must be
narrowed in construction by a religious adherence thereto.”21
This suggests that the Charming Betsy presumption traditionally represented, at least
primarily, not a pure policy assessment but an intrinsically legal doctrine. Even if its application
was meant to avoid international discord, the only relevant discord was that created by violations
of the law of nations.22 In Empagran, by contrast, the Court speaks not of compatibility with
international law, but instead of compatibility with foreign “sovereign authority” and “legitimate
sovereign interests.”23 It thereby turns the legal doctrine into a policy. Scholars have interpreted
the Charming Betsy presumption as an implied deference of international relations matters to the
Executive.24 The Court in Empagran apparently accepts the view of international law as
international relations, but draws a different conclusion: if international law is international
governance, then the courts themselves, first and foremost the U.S. Supreme Court, must adopt
the role of global governor.25 In a world in which diplomatic protests addressed to the executive
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are being supplemented by amicus briefs addressed to the Court—in the Empagran case, seven
foreign governments submitted such briefs—26 this seems a logical step.
This rise of international relations as basis of the Charming Betsy presumption coincides
with the decline of international law. Dutifully, Justice Breyer cites § 403 of the Restatement on
Foreign Relations, but a real analysis of whether the assertion of jurisdiction would violate §
403, or international law more generally, is absent. More strikingly, there is also no detailed
analysis of “potentially conflicting laws.”27 If Justice Breyer’s thoughts on the globalization of
law were apt, one might expect the potential for such conflicts to be low. Elsewhere, he has
claimed that “[t]he commercial law of the various states, for example, has become close to a
single, unified body of law.“28 Indeed, price-fixing is banned in nearly every legal system in the
world (a point emphasized in Empagran, ironically, by the defendants). Plaintiffs’ lawyers had
even claimed that the ban on price-fixing amounted to a principle of customary international law,
a suggestion the lower court rejected.29 Moreover, the effects doctrine for establishing
jurisdiction in antitrust matters, whose contours were still in dispute worldwide when the U.S.
Supreme Court previously addressed the application of the Sherman Act against British
reinsurers in Hartford Fire,30 has since become universally accepted, albeit with variants.
However, Justice Breyer does not consider such agreement on ends to be sufficient to
assume similarity: “[E]ven where nations agree about primary conduct, say, price fixing, they
disagree dramatically about appropriate remedies.”31 Interestingly, Sir William Scott argued
similarly about the slave trade in Le Louis: “Nor is it to be argued, that because other nations
approve the ultimate purpose, they must therefore submit to every measure which any one state
or its subjects may inconsiderately adopt for its attainment.”32 In Empagran, this speculation
might have suggested an actual comparative law analysis. For example, the Court might have
considered distinguishing between plaintiffs from states that have a functioning antitrust
regulation scheme (and had said so in their amicus curiae briefs) and those from states without
such a scheme. Indeed, in other contexts, Justice Breyer has famously suggested how fruitful it is
to look at other nations’ laws, even where this is not mandated.33 When he speaks about the
26
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Empagran opinion in presentations, he likes to point out that the Court, in order to decide, “had
to know something about the antitrust law of the European Union.”34 The Empagran decision
itself displays little such analysis. The Court considered a detailed comparative law analysis “too
complex to prove workable”:
Courts would have to examine how foreign law, compared with American law,
treats not only price fixing but also, say, information-sharing agreements, patentlicensing price conditions, territorial product resale limitations, and various forms
of joint venture, in respect to both primary conduct and remedy. The legally and
economically technical nature of that enterprise means lengthier proceedings,
appeals, and more proceedings--to the point where procedural costs and delays
could themselves threaten interference with a foreign nation's ability to maintain the
integrity of its own antitrust enforcement system.35
The image remains of a Court that is not only aware of its role in an interdependent
world, but also willing and equipped with the tools necessary to fulfill that role, even if it
ultimately prefers caution over action. The tools are mainly those of international relations, not
international law. Deference to international law gives way to deference to foreign sovereigns;
detailed analysis of the exact requirements of international law gives way to an analysis of the
likelihood of international conflict. Forty years earlier, the Sabbatino Court was criticized for
adopting its own “strong sense … that its engagement [in foreign relations] may hinder, rather
than further, this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a
whole in the international sphere.”36 No similar reaction to Empagran has occurred.
III. AN ISOLATIONIST READING:
EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN A POST-TERRITORIAL WORLD
What are the consequences of this transnationalist, post-territorial, “work together in
harmomy” jurisprudence for Empagran? The answer is, to put it mildly, surprising:
No one denies that America's antitrust laws, when applied to foreign conduct, can
interfere with a foreign nation's ability independently to regulate its own
commercial affairs. … But why is it reasonable to apply those laws to foreign
conduct insofar as that conduct causes independent foreign harm and that foreign
harm alone gives rise to the plaintiff's claim?37
This is quite a striking move. Justice Breyer starts with the recognition that both regulated events
and regulatory instruments transcend territorial boundaries: we are interdependent because
34
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actions in and by one state have impacts on other states. He ends with the conclusion that we
must confine application of our laws to strictly territorial boundaries. Because the world has
become deterritorialized, we must apply our laws in a strictly territorial fashion. Because the
world has become interdependent, we must allow for independent regulation by different
regulators. In order to “work together in harmony,” each nation must act in isolation for itself:
the U.S. regulates the U.S. market; Japan regulates the Japanese market, and so on. And the real
trigger lies not in the valid sovereignty interests of foreign nations, but in the lack of sovereign
interests of the United States. Suddenly, we have moved away from the twenty-first century
world of interdependence and cooperation into the nineteenth-century U.S. role of isolationism
and the desire to keep exclusive territorial competences strictly separate.
It follows as a matter of course that, in such a world, extraterritorial application of U.S.
law is unavailable. All that we can hope for is persuasion:
Where foreign anticompetitive conduct plays a significant role and where foreign
injury is independent of domestic effects, Congress might have hoped that
America's antitrust laws, so fundamental a component of our own economic system,
would commend themselves to other nations as well. But, if America's antitrust
policies could not win their own way in the international marketplace for such
ideas, Congress, we must assume, would not have tried to impose them, in an act of
legal imperialism, through legislative fiat.38
Justice Marshall expressed a similar idea in The Antelope when he suggested that “[t]he parties
to the modern law of nations do not propagate their principles by force.”39 Still, it is not clear
what exactly Justice Breyer has in mind. America’s antitrust policies have, in fact, won much of
their own way in the international marketplace for ideas40 – including the idea of private
enforcement, which is being actively discussed in the European Union, and including leniency
for whistleblowers. If anything, the difference is not in the substantive antitrust laws but in the
procedure for their enforcement, but procedure has traditionally been a matter for lex fori.
How did we get from a “highly interdependent commercial world” to “independent
foreign harm” and “a foreign nation’s ability independently to regulate its own commercial
affairs”? By way of an assumption so crucial that Justice Breyer numerous times. Here is the
most elaborate formulation of the fiction: “We reemphasize that we base our decision upon the
following: the price-fixing conduct significantly and adversely affects both customers outside the
United States and customers within the United States, but the adverse foreign effect is
independent of any adverse domestic effect.”41 This assumption is a fiction. In a “highly
interdependent commercial world,” effects on one nation’s markets are never independent from
38
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effects on another nation’s markets.42 The vitamins cartel, in order to avoid arbitrage, had to keep
prices roughly the same in all geographically close markets. Justice Breyer knows this, but he
faces a challenge: the globalization he invokes comes back to haunt him. The doctrines which the
Court has at its disposal were made for a nineteenth-century world defined by territorial states.
These doctrines do not fit globalization and the transcendence of territorial borders. Perhaps new
doctrines are needed; perhaps the old doctrine must be deterritorialized.43 The Court, however,
finds another way. Instead of deterritorializing existing rules, it reterritorializes the phenomena to
which these rules are applied. Rather than adapt the doctrines to globalization, it adapts
globalization to the doctrines. If the nineteenth-century rules do not fit the twenty-first-century
world, too bad for the latter – the Court turns it, by fiction, into a nineteenth-century world.
This result, of course, does not require all the globalization talk, as Justice Scalia’s
concurrence makes clear
I concur in the judgment of the Court because the language of the statute is readily
susceptible of the interpretation the Court provides and because only that
interpretation is consistent with the principle that statutes should be read in accord
with the customary deference to the application of foreign countries' laws within
their own territories.44
This concurrence links the decision to another venerated canon of international law, the
presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes, as formulated by Justice Story in The
Apollon.45 That presumption, however, has become problematic, because territoriality has
changed both its social and legal meaning. In 1825, jurisdiction was thought to be largely
confined to national territory. Consequently, the presumption against extraterritoriality was
almost equivalent to a presumption against violations of international law. Roger Alford neatly
explains how this idea withered away in U.S. law in the twentieth century.46Today, international
law no longer poses such extensive restrictions on domestic jurisdiction over foreign conduct.
The presumption against extraterritoriality has survived this shift, but it has lost its grounding in
international law.47
Moreover, this decline of territoriality as a limit in international law has gone hand-inhand with the declining importance of territoriality in society. Modern transportation has made
42
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crossing boundaries much easier; new modes of communication make territorial boundaries
meaningless for many important endeavors; globalized markets pay little respect to national
boundaries. The conduct of important actors, which is the object of most statutory regulation, is
trans-territorial. A canon of interpretation that insists on territoriality stands in odd contrast to
these developments.
Prior to the shift, Congress was presumed not to legislate beyond territorial boundaries
because that would be unusual and would violate international law. Now that the canon has lost
its legal foundation in international law and its teleological foundation in a presumed
predominantly local character of regulated behavior, it is unclear what justifies it. One
suggestion is that courts should avoid extraterritorial application to avoid subjecting the United
States to foreign criticism without participation by the political branches,48 but this does not
explain why limits of scope should be those of territorial boundaries. Another justification is “the
commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.”49 This
justification is weak where, as in Empagran, the statute at hand is one aimed at determining the
scope of extraterritorial application (though the justification has been used in such contexts,
too.)50 More importantly, the justification begs the very question of what exactly are “domestic
concerns.”51 In choice of law, such insights have led in the twentieth century to the development
of interest analysis, whereby courts determine the scope of application on the basis of
governmental interest and then resolve resulting conflicts with the regulatory interests of other
states. If the presumption against extraterritoriality was once a presumption against the violation
of choice-of-law rules, as has been argued,52 one might expect it to change along with choice-oflaw rules, as many authors have suggested it should.53 Empagran suggests the powerful grip that
ideas of territoriality still hold even over a Justice who claims to be above it.
Territorial limits to jurisdiction present normative problems when applied to phenomena
that do not respect territorial boundaries. If the effects of certain conduct transcend boundaries,
while congressional statutes are presumed to remain within territorial boundaries, then the effects
outside the borders remain unregulated. This has led some to conclude that the presumption
against extraterritoriality, revived under the Rehnquist Court,54 is merely a fig leaf for judicial
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dislike of congressional regulation.55 Justice Holmes’ decision in American Banana has been
explained by his aversion to the Sherman Act.”56 Justice Breyer, after deciding Empagran, has
been praised as “the go-to guy for American business in regulatory and economic cases.”57
Such crude realist speculations on the Justices’ real intentions must remain somewhat
speculative even for individual decisions; for the law at large, they have limited explanatory
value. In Empagran, especially, the suggestion that the real goal is underregulation may not fully
hold. The Court emphasizes that other countries have antitrust laws, too. Presumably, therefore,
regulation of the cartel would not stop at U.S. borders. Instead, other nations would regulate,
even if they did so by different means. This suggests that today the presumption against
extraterritoriality is not merely a policy decision in favor of multinational corporations. The
Court refuses to concentrate all claims concerning the global cartel in one nation’s courts,58 but it
does not reject the idea that all these claims should be heard somewhere. Instead, the
presumption against extraterritoriality establishes a checkerboard map of regulatory authorities,
in which each country is responsible for regulating its own territory. This checkerboard map
resembles that of the nineteenth century, but the resemblance is superficial. Then, it represented
the reality of most social relations and of international law. Today, territorial borders are an
arbitrary and formalist device in a globalized world, but one that helps to avoid overlapping
regulatory claims precisely because of its formal character.59 The nineteenth-century
checkerboard view of the world survives in the twenty-first century, but it changes its character:
it has become a formal-technical device for the allocation of regulatory authority.
IV. A HEGEMONIALIST READING:
THE ABSENCE OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD
A problem remains. The idea of decentralized regulation – each regulates its own
markets, so all the world is regulated – can succeed only if regulatory authority exists
everywhere on the checkerboard. This is a problem in antitrust law. Although the United States
is no longer the only country with effective antitrust enforcement, many countries still lack the
capacity or political will (or both) to crack down on cartels. None of these considerations,
however, can be found in the Empagran decision. The most striking passage in the opinion is one
in which Justice Breyer suggests such a checkerboard world of regulation: “Why should
American law supplant, for example, Canada's or Great Britain's or Japan's own determination
55
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about how best to protect Canadian or British or Japanese customers from anticompetitive
conduct…?”60
This is a strange way of putting the problem. In Empagran, the named plaintiffs were not
“Canadian, or British or Japanese customers”– they came from Ukraine, Ecuador, and Panama.
Yet throughout the opinion, Justice Breyer never addresses the sovereign interests of those
countries. When he states that application of U.S. law “would undermine foreign nations' own
antitrust enforcement policies,”61 he is not speaking of Ecuador (which may be quite happy if the
United States cracks down on cartels impacting that country).62 Instead, he speaks of Germany
and Canada. When he fears that “to apply our remedies would unjustifiably permit [foreign
nations’] citizens to bypass their own less generous remedial schemes, thereby upsetting a
balance of competing considerations that their own domestic antitrust laws embody,”63 the
balance of competing considerations he has in mind is that of Germany, Canada, and Japan, not
that of Ukraine. In the end, Justice Breyer is not allowing Canada, Great Britain, or Japan to
determine how best to protect their consumers as he proclaims. Instead, he is protecting
Canadian, British, and Japanese corporations against their overcharged customers abroad.64 All
named plaintiffs come from developing countries; all defendants and all amicus briefs come
from developed countries. The court will apparently listen to the latter, and ignore the former.
In doing so, the Court adopts not only the nineteenth century idea of neatly distinguished
territorial entities; it also adopts the old idea of an international law limited to European and
North American countries.65 Developed countries regulate their markets, and the rest of the
world remains unregulated – with the consequence that European and American defendants can
retrieve the money they lose to American and European plaintiffs and regulators. Justice
Breyer’s harmony among countries creates quite an exclusive club. In the name of avoiding U.S.
hegemony over other developed countries, the Supreme Court endorses hegemony of developed
over undeveloped countries. It avoids the imperialism of imposing U.S. law on others, but it
endorses the imperialism of restricting access to U.S. law.
The exclusive focus on the sovereign interests of Western countries is best demonstrated,
ironically, by the near absence of non-Western countries in Western discourse, especially in the
United States. But it has a long and well-known history in international law. An uneasy relation
to developing countries characterized the Court’s first major opinion on international antitrust,
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American Banana.66 There, Justice Holmes suggested that the presumption against
extraterritoriality might not apply to “regions subject … to no law that civilized countries would
recognize as adequate,”67 but he did not ultimately apply this exception to Costa Rica, which for
the time has aptly been characterized as a “Banana Republic”.68 One explanation can perhaps be
found in a citation to a passage in Dicey’s work on conflict of laws dealing with “law governing
acts done in uncivilized countries.”69 Dicey realized that deference to uncivilized countries could
hardly be justified by principles of civility. Nonetheless, he suggested applying the rules
governing relations with civilized countries by analogy, as far as possible.70 In other words, the
inclusion of non-Western nations in the family of nations does not alter the concept of a state in
international law. Instead, that concept, crafted after Western models, is imposed on nonWestern countries by analogy.
We can see even more striking similarities in the treatment of Africa in the slave trade
cases. In Le Louis, Sir Walter Scott was aware that deference to the interests of France operates
to the detriment of Africa – “peace in Europe will be war in Africa.”71 In the end, however,
relations with France were more important than those with Africa. Scott asked: “Why is the
British judge to intrude himself in subsidium juris, when everything requisite will be performed
in the French Court in a legal and effectual manner?”72 . The ensuing move from natural law to
positivism foreshadowed the U.S. Supreme Court’s similar move, beginning with Marshall’s
opinion in The Antelope.73 Less often discussed is how the move leads to a reduction in
international law’s reach: if only the interests and positions of states count, then states that are
unable to have their positions heard will be ignored.
Justice Breyer does not play out the developing against the developed world in the same
way. Rather, he seems to imply that all countries share the same sovereign interest in selfdetermination, which must be respected, even if most developing countries lack the means to
crack down on big international cartels. This equation among sovereigns is reminiscent of Chief
Justice Marshall’s argument why a universally shared law of nations against slavery does not
exist: “The parties to the modern law of nations do not propagate their principles by force; and
Africa has not yet adopted them. Throughout the whole extent of that immense continent, so far
as we know its history, it is still the law of nations that prisoners are slaves.”74 Of course, this
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curious “gesture towards including Africa within the law of nations”75 was of little use to Africa,
or at least to its inhabitants subject to the slave trade. Moreover, Marshall confined the judge’s
standard of international law to “the general assent of that portion of the world of which he
considers himself as a part”76 – in other words, the Western world, which has long supported the
slave trade. In such a world, which treats slavery as either a sovereign choice by sovereign
African states, or as a given fact of African customs that Western nations are free to accept or
reject, a genuine African interest in the abolition of slavery is absent from any analysis.
This suggests that the role of sovereignty for developing countries may be more complex
than is often argued. Traditionally, the extraterritorial application of developed countries’ laws is
criticized for stripping developing countries of their own regulatory independence,77 with U.S.
courts “as agents of U.S. hegemony.”78 The underlying assumption is that developing countries’
sovereignty is merely formal: they lack the economic and political power to be truly
independent. Even if this assumption is correct, the conclusion does not necessarily follow.
Cases from The Antelope through Empagran suggest that the refusal to apply law
extraterritorially -- especially regarding conduct that is almost universally condemned (slavery,
price-fixing) – can also be a problem, because it leaves third world countries unprotected against
the power of transnational commercial actors. If developing countries lack the domestic means to
regulate those actors themselves, they may depend on developed countries’ willingness to
regulate their own actors.
The Court’s real choice in Empagran is not between imperialism and international
harmony. Rather, the choice is between two kinds of imperialism: one that comes from imposing
U.S. law on the rest of the world, and the other from rejecting access to the courts necessary for
protection against Western corporate actors. The Court avoids one kind of imperialism, but
Justice Breyer’s pride seems unwarranted, because the Court falls, perhaps unavoidably, for
another kind.
The omnipresence of some kind of imperialism suggests that a proper analysis of the
decision might be framed in terms of empire – not in the sense of the United States as an empire,
but in the sense of a transnational super-state that transcends individual states and imposes a
collective logic on all of them.79 Susan Marks has translated this dystopia into international
law;80 her text suggests eerie parallels with Empagran. When she speaks of “a new, global form
of sovereignty composed of agencies which operate in diverse arenas (national, regional, and
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global), yet interlock to form a single framework of governance for the entire world,” a “regime
that knows no territorial boundaries,” that is “dedicated to the inauguration of perpetual peace
(even if … it remains enmeshed with the deployment and rationalization of violence),”81 she
paints a picture that looks very much like Justice Breyer’s. However, instead of praising
international harmony, she highlights the totalitarian and violent character of such a regime:
“today hierarchies are constituted and sustained by more complex patterns and logics, which are
obscured, and hence reinforced, where globalization is elided with neo-imperialism.”82 When she
goes on to find that “with deterritorialization comes reterritorialization,”83 she could have the
isolationist reading of Empagran in mind. When she finally cites Hardt and Negri for the idea
that “the geographical and racial lines of oppression and exploitation that were established
during the era of colonialism and imperialism have in many respects not declined but instead
increased exponentially,"84 the link to slavery is made.
V. CONCLUSION
We should not exaggerate. Marks’ neo-marxist analysis is no less hyperbolical than
Justice Breyer’s neoliberal celebration of nations working in harmony. The important insight is
that both analyses are available simultaneously.
In the end, Empagran is transnationalist in rhetoric, isolationist in application, and
hegemonial in its effect. A decision with a seemingly straightforward argument is found riddled
in the conflict between these different logics. A decision with few references to international law
displays deep links to some of the most pressing international law issues. A decision with
forward-looking globalization rhetoric is mired in history. A decision praising harmony displays
somber parallels to decisions refusing interference with the evil of slave trade. This has
implications for our understanding of international law today, and of its history.
So, does international law in the Supreme Court manifest qualities of continuity or
change? The easy answer, of course, is that it displays both change and continuity. The use of the
Charming Betsy canon suggests continuity; its transformation from a legal doctrine to an
instrument of foreign politics suggests change. The recognition of globalization and an
interdependent world suggests change; the effective return to strict territoriality represents
continuity, or even regress. The presumption against extraterritoriality is a remnant from times
past; its function as a formal-technical device to allocate regulatory power has changed.
But the real answer is more complex. The question of continuity or change presumes a
linear development that is hard to discern in Empagran. The three different readings of the
opinion – transnationalist, isolationist, and hegemonialist – have a particular relevance for
historical analysis. If all readings of the decision are possible, perhaps the opinion is rooted in
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various times. This means, in turn, that Empagran does not represent the end point of some
linear development, or some sequence of different periods that neatly follow one another. Rather,
these different logics can all coexist within one opinion, sometimes one paragraph or even one
sentence. If Empagran is emblematic of the new period of globalization, then it demonstrates
that globalization is not a time period separate from others. Rather, it is characterized by what
Ernst Bloch has called Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen, the simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous.85
Marks’ description of empire as a regime that has overcome not only territorial but also
temporal boundaries reflects this aspect. Empire has long been a topic of American history.
Washington’s concept of the United States as an “infant empire” and Jefferson’s dream of an
“empire of liberty” attest to a celebration of empire from the nation’s founding.86 Discussion
whether today’s United States is an empire has reappeared, with some celebrating, some
criticizing the perceived role of the United States as a modern empire that does not require
territorial acquisitions to rule the world.87 The history of international law in the U.S. Supreme
Court is also the history of empire, and the current Court cannot escape that history.
In the end, the absence of such analyses -- both in Empagran and in its scholarly reception -- is
itself relevant. Scholars view the decision as a move towards comity and transnationalism, like
they view the slave trade cases as the move from a natural law conception of international law to
a positivist understanding, and this technical character of international law discourse makes it
possible to draw connections between the cases. The field, with its core elements such as
sovereign interests and territoriality, has a formal-conceptual quality that makes it applicable
over different time periods and vastly different issues. That propensity for abstraction, in the face
of fundamental changes in world history, can sometimes represent a shocking absence of concern
for real life problems. Sometimes, by contrast, this propensity is how international law remains
able, in the face of such changes, to serve as “gentle civilizer,” as Martti Koskenniemi has
pointed out.88 Empagran, with its reaches back into history, both visible and invisible, represents
both.
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